Democracy and the other failures by Doug Campbell
G
ravina Island, population 50, sits near the southeast
corner of Alaska, just about 45 miles from the
Canadian border. It has about 1,800 acres of timber
and is accessible to the mainland via a seven-minute ferry ride.
There wouldn’t be much more to say about Gravina Island,
except that in 2005 it was on the receiving end of one 
of the most notorious cases of pork-barrel politics in U.S. 
history — a $223 million federal earmark for the so-called 
“bridge to nowhere.”
The Ketchikan Gravina Island Access Project, as it 
is officially known, became the poster child for seeming 
government waste. The planned span would be as long 
as the Golden Gate Bridge and high enough for cruise 
ships to pass underneath. How on earth, watchdog 
groups wondered, could legislators back something that
would cost so much and benefit so few? It was, as one critic
put it, “an abomination.”
The bridge’s defenders make some reasonable points
about its actual merits. But putting aside that debate, there
exists a theory which perfectly explains any such apparent 
legislative breakdown. It is called public choice, and it 
has quietly become the default lens through which many
social scientists view democracy.
Public choice uses economic principles to analyze 
political activity. It assumes that people are primarily 
self-interested, be they businessmen or politicians. That’s in
contrast to traditional political theory, which holds that 
government agents put aside their private interests when
working for the public.
What’s also different about public choice theory is that it
assumes that most voters don’t pay attention to the details of
the legislative process, simply because their ballots are, 
on an individual basis, highly unlikely to decide an election. 
In other words, their votes don’t really matter. As a result,
politicians cater to the small groups of voters who are 
paying attention — special interests — thus maximizing
their chances of re-election. In some cases, special interests
can be lobbies representing large groups of workers, like
those in the steel industry; in other cases, they may be 
small groups in specific congressional districts that benefit
from certain projects — like tourism workers gaining 
from the proposed Gravina bridge. Public choicers call 
this an example of “diffused costs, concentrated benefits.”
The logic is persuasive, especially when applied to 
other examples of uneconomic policies on trade and 
certain subsidies. Though public choice theory faces 
legitimate objections, in general it has held up well since 
its introduction 50 years ago. It is at base a critique of
democracy, pointing out the difficulty in obtaining socially
efficient outcomes under majority rule.
(In brief, one of the leading alternative takes on public
choice has come to be associated with Nobel Prize-
winning economist George Stigler. The idea is that 
society is always going to have an interest in doing things like
helping unemployed steelworkers or building bridges 
somewhere. Of all the ways of achieving such goals, this view
goes, our flawed democratic process might actually be the
most efficient. Efforts such as lobbying that might seem
wasteful are only so when compared with outcomes in an
unattainable, perfectly frictionless world. This doesn’t make
public choice wrong, but it does distinguish between its
explanatory analysis of democracy and whether or how 
to fix it.)
But now comes perhaps public choice’s most significant
challenge yet, and it comes from an economist 
at the very university where the nation’s preeminent public
choice center is housed.
In his new book, Bryan Caplan turns public choice 
theory on its head: It’s not that voters end up with 
(admittedly bad) policies that they don’t want, Caplan
argues. Rather, the public is getting precisely what it
demands — policies that make voters feel good but don’t
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special interests misses the point.
Voters actually like protectionism and
bridges to nowhere. As Caplan puts it
in  The Myth of the Rational Voter: 
Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies,
“If I am right, then a great deal of 
published research is wrong.” Equally,
if he is right, then the entire social 
science profession might have to
rethink its approach to reforming the
democratic process.
Public Choice
Anthony Downs, in his landmark 1957
book, An Economic Theory of Democracy,
described that in a two-candidate 
election, the smartest course was for 
a politician to cater to the voting 
preferences of the median voter. The
trick is to move as close to the center
without overlapping with the rival
platform, thus taking along all of 
the extreme voters and the highest
number of swing voters. The “median
voter theorem” is an oversimplifica-
tion, as it strictly holds only when
there is a single choice at stake. But it
makes it easier to visualize how 
the democratic process actually works.
Downs modeled democracy as a 
market where politicians were 
motivated by winning elections more
so than upholding the public interest. 
With this view of politicians as 
rational and self-interested, Downs
helped lay the foundation for public
choice theory.
James Buchanan, teaching at 
the University of Virginia, formalized 
the public choice concept with 
colleague Gordon Tullock. The 
duo’s  Calculus of Consent, published 
in 1962, is considered public choice’s
seminal text. The premise was straight-
forward: “Our approach is based on the
idea that, insofar as this pursuit of self-
interest does take place, it should be
taken into account in the organization
of the political constitution,” the
authors wrote.
After a stop at Virginia Tech, both
Buchanan and Tullock eventually 
settled at George Mason University,
where the Center for Study of Public
Choice is now housed. In 1986,
Buchanan won the Nobel Prize in 
economics for his work on public
choice theory. What was once a 
revolutionary approach to examining
political behavior had become 
the norm.
Maybe the approach doesn’t sound
so radical today, nor all that conse-
quential. After all, if politicians are
mostly interested in getting reelected,
they ought to be simply implementing
the will of the people, right?
The problem with that story is that
voters are also self-interested. And
that doesn’t necessarily mean they
support policies which will make 
them better off. Instead, it means they
are unlikely to spend much time 
figuring out what will make them 
better off in the first place. According
to rational choice theory, they are 
likely to make a calculation about 
the benefits they would receive from
their vote versus the costs of becoming
informed and then casting a ballot.
More often than not, because of the
large pool of votes cast, an individual
vote doesn’t count (much), so the
rational choice is not to spend time
becoming informed about broad
issues. (At the same time, voters still
tend to care about narrow issues of
local concern.) This contrasts people’s
behavior in the regular market. When
buying a car, a consumer is likely to
research the options before making a
selection; when in the voting booth,
such research may seem pointless.
With most voters uninformed, 
special-interest groups hold great
sway. Tullock put it this way:
“Members of Congress wishing to be
reelected will take careful account of
issues and bills that strongly affect
small minorities, whether it is a reduc-
tion of transfers to them, an increase
in the taxes specific to them (like road
taxes for freight carriers), or a special
tax exemption. Considerably less
attention is given to the issues affecting
the general population because 
the voters are unlikely to be strongly
motivated to express their support or
favor at the ballot box.”
Here is an example of how it works
in practice: Most economists agree
that free trade makes countries better
off. But protectionist policies that
make little economic sense abound.
This is because the pain of losing steel
jobs is both obvious and concentrated,
while the pain of paying, say, $200
more per car because steel is more
expensive is ambiguous and widely 
dispersed. So politicians tend to
respond to those most acutely affected
by trade — the steelworkers and their
representatives who complain rather
than the average consumer.
According to public choice, special-
interest groups seek “rents,” or public
privileges transferred for private use.
Some people would call the Gravina
Island bridge project an example of a
rent. Through the phenomenon called
“logrolling,” politicians agree to back
each others’ pet projects, rolling up all
these earmarks into big spending 
bills that sail through to law.
There are a couple of problems
with this process. For one, having an
entire industry of people devoted to
seeking political favors is wasteful,
because many of these lobbying efforts
fail. And many of those that don’t 
are inefficient. A direct transfer to
struggling steelmakers might be more
efficient. But since such transfers are
typically hard to accomplish in 
the public realm, they turn into 
indirect subsidies, ultimately hurting
consumers and reducing incentives for
steel companies to innovate and invest
in their futures.
Into the Mainstream
Geoffrey Brennan, an Australian 
economist and former president of the
Public Choice Society, is now a visiting
professor in a joint program between
Duke University and the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Brennan says that democracy, as seen
through public choice, has two main
problems to deal with. First, some
groups of people won’t be able to form
lobbies to protect their interests as
well as other groups — a social justice
issue. The second problem is that even
if everybody were able to defend their
interests, the kind of policies that get
adopted in this mutual exploitation
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choice is saying is that these are 
characteristic features of the whole
system,” Brennan says.
Oftentimes, the public choice 
remedy for such “government failures”
is to turn to the market. For this 
reason, public choice followers often
get branded as free-market zealots.
This is not an entirely fair criticism.
Yes, public choicers say, markets 
do fail. But the relevant question is,
compared to what? Assuming that 
government can always do better 
is just folly. That’s why, on balance, 
the public choice solution for many
problems is to limit government inter-
vention, where monitoring is weaker
and rent-seeking and logrolling are
more likely to be factors in producing
bad policies. Given the incentives that
legislators face to make bad policy, 
the prudent thing to do is to 
handcuff them as much as possible 
by limiting the number of things 
that get decided in the public sphere.
Buchanan called public choice 
“politics without romance.”
Other market-oriented alternatives
include letting more than one govern-
ment bureau provide the same service,
thus promoting competition and 
theoretically improving efficiency.
Term limits and line-item vetoes are
other standard public choice remedies
to government failure (which might
include the enormously high — 90
percent or more — re-election rates
for House incumbents).
But return to public choice’s 
central premise — that voters are
rationally ignorant. The implicit idea
here is that voters are getting policies
that they don’t want. Now there is a
young economist who questions this
premise. Voters are not ignorant, says
Bryan Caplan. They are irrational, 
and their views are reflected in the
irrational policies they get.
Rational Irrationality?
In 1995, economist Donald Wittman,
at the University of California at Santa
Cruz, published The Myth of
Democratic Failure: Why Political
Institutions Are Efficient, based on 
several papers that appeared some
years before. In it, Wittman attacked
public choice as being based on sev-
eral bad assumptions. Caplan was
most intrigued by Wittman’s central 
critique — the assumption that voters
are “extremely stupid.” Wittman had a
number of reasons why this might be a
stretch, including that voters process
more information than public choice 
economists give them credit for.
What’s more, Wittman asserted that
even if people are “stupid,” it doesn’t
matter because their random biases will
even out in the aggregate, producing
economically sound policy.
This is true, thought Caplan, so
long as those biases are in fact random
and not systematic. But what if voters
are systematically stupid? Or, put
another way, irrational? That is, what 
if voters in large, consistent numbers
hold beliefs that are out of touch with
expert economic thought? That would
be a completely different problem
than the one public choice economists
had identified. In many cases, it 
would mean that irrational voter
beliefs and irrational economic policy
were identical. Perhaps special-inter-
est-bound politicians weren’t shoving
bad policy down the voters’ throats 
at all. Perhaps voters were swallowing
precisely what they had already 
decided tasted good.
To figure this out, Caplan got his
hands on a relatively fresh data set. 
It came from a 1996 survey commis-
sioned by the Washington Post, Kaiser
Family Foundation, and Harvard
University Survey Project. Called the
Survey of Americans and Economists
on the Economy, it was based 
on interviews with 1,510 members 
of the general public and 250 
Ph.D. economists.
One of Caplan’s goals was to over-
come the standard criticism about
studies like his: So what if economists
and the public think different things?
What if economists are wrong?
Economists get a lot less respect
than other experts. Few people 
question the advice of medical doctors 
like they question the counsel of 
economists. Eat less fat? OK. Knock
down trade barriers? Not so fast.
Caplan explains how he set out 
to establish the correctness of some
fundamental economic concepts.
Typically, the biases of economists are
labeled as being either self-serving or
ideological in nature. But these are
testable biases, Caplan says, and the
Survey of Americans and Economists
could be used to test for them. If econ-
omists are biased by their income,
then both wealthy economists and
wealthy members of the general 
public ought to hold the same views.
Same for ideological bias — conserva-
tive economists and conservative
voters ought to agree, Caplan says. 
But his parsing of the survey shows
they don’t — that being an economist
is much more likely to make a person
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Exceptions: Trucking Deregulation
Of course, there are examples where public choice
theory seems to fall short. Diffuse populations have
come together to support good policies in the face of
staunch special-interest opposition. The story of
trucking deregulation is relevant here. Trucking for
most of the 20th century was tightly regulated, with
new carriers having to be completely unopposed
before receiving certificates to operate. Rules also
required that carrier rates be made public, allowing for
protests from competitors. And later, rates were fixed.
The result was an industry with high barriers to entry
and a complicated web of routes that served few 
interests beyond the trucking companies and the
union members they employed. 
As studies mounted about the steep cost of
regulation, a movement began to open up the 
industry to competition and lift rate restrictions.
Despite intense counter-lobbying from unions and
trucking firms, a diverse coalition that included 
liberals and political appointees from both Republican
and Democratic administrations succeeded in ulti-
mately getting Congress to approve the Motor Carrier
Act of 1980, which effectively deregulated trucking.
Does the case of trucking deregulation undermine
public choice? Not quite. Most public choice theorists
would probably agree that when conditions get partic-
ularly bad — as the trucking industry had become —
then reform is possible. There was in essence a super-
majority of the voting public in favor of deregulation,
a force too powerful for special interests to overcome.
— DOUG CAMPBELL
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whether that economist is of a liberal
or conservative persuasion, rich or 
not so rich.
Having dismissed the notion that
economists are biased, Caplan makes
the reasonable leap that their views
might rightly be judged as expert. 
As such, where the public disagrees,
the public is likely to be wrong. 
And the differences that Caplan 
logs are legion, specifically with regard
to views on free trade, immigration,
wage and price controls, and the 
overall state of the economy. “The
public really holds, for starters, that
prices are not governed by supply and
demand, protectionism helps the
economy, saving labor is a bad idea,
and living standards are falling,”
Caplan writes.
Reorienting Public Choice
Now, what Caplan says he sees here
flies in the face of conventional 
economic thought. When building
mathematical models of human 
decisionmaking, economists almost
always take a rational expectations
approach — that people cannot be
fooled on a systematic basis, and 
they learn from their mistakes. 
In the public choice model, the rational
part of voter decisionmaking is not to
spend much time invested in learning
about the issues because individual
votes hardly matter. In Caplan’s
model, voters are being rational about
the price of their irrationality.
The distinction between “igno-
rance” and “irrationality” is important.
Being ignorant, as standard economic
theory sees it, means that a person
may not have seen the value of becom-
ing informed, but if he had, then his
viewpoint could have been changed to
reach the proper conclusion. Like, if
people were presented with the 
facts about the benefits of trade, then
they would favor it over protection-
ism. Irrational people, on the other
hand, still refuse to rethink their 
position even when presented with
contradictory evidence.
The reason irrationality can exist
on a systematic basis, so far as 
economic beliefs go, is because of the
small cost of holding those beliefs.
“One hundred and fifty million
Americans can be wrong, and in fact
easily,” Caplan says in an interview.
“You could think the craziest thing in
the world about politics, but if you
have one vote, it won’t come back to
hurt you. People can have comfortable
beliefs rather than true beliefs.”
In this way, Caplan seeks to recon-
sider public choice theory. Why spend
so much time building models with
rational actors if, in fact, voters are
irrational? In his book, Caplan uses the
example of economists trying to
explain why economic reform is so
unpopular in developing countries.
How come so few people support
changes that would make them better
off? To Caplan, the answer is obvious:
People are irrational.
“When you put that together you
get a very simple picture of how the
world works,” Caplan says. “Voters vote
on the basis of what is best for society,
but their beliefs are so misguided that
you have people unselfishly voting for
policies that are bad for people.”
Where Caplan agrees with standard
public choice followers is that democ-
racy doesn’t deserve its hallowed
status. But where public choice sees
democracy as flawed because of its ten-
dency to be controlled by special
interests, Caplan sees it as flawed
because it allows people to believe
things that can hurt their standard of
living. The electoral process effectively
allows people to behave irresponsibly,
in ways that are ultimately irrational.
AFresh Look At Reform
Standard public choice thinking on
how to improve democracy is to let
the private sector handle more efforts
traditionally handled by government.
In this way, the costs of poor decisions
become more visible, so holding 
irrational economic beliefs becomes
harder to do.
Caplan agrees with this assessment.
But where public choice views the vot-
ing public as somewhat hopelessly
ignorant, Caplan believes that an 
“irrational” public may actually be
receptive to education, and possibly
be improved by it. He bases this
approach on his own study — the
more educated people are, the more
likely they are to think like econo-
mists. (Also in this category of people
who think more like economists are
men and those whose incomes have
grown a lot over their careers.)
Perhaps with earlier intervention, 
economics could make their principles
more comforting to the general public.
To make economic education more
palatable, Caplan says, economists
need to change the way they sell their
ideas. Instead of perpetually hedging
their statements, economists could be
bolder, if not blunter: Price controls
cause shortages and surpluses, econo-
mists should say. End of statement,
with no need for footnotes or dis-
claimers of why this statement is 
not absolutely and always correct. 
And then, make this sort of material
standard in primary and secondary
education. Instead of teaching state
capitals, teach supply and demand.
“We have something useful to say here.
It’s hard to swallow, so we’ve got to 
be persistent,” Caplan says.
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Factors that make people more likely to think like an 
economist include education, positive income growth, 
and being male. This graph plots the degree to which 
average people disagree if one is a Ph.D. economist 
and one is not.
SOURCE: The Myth of the Rational Voter by Bryan Caplan
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Caplan believes that certain groups 
of people are more qualified to make 
economic decisions. He favors panels
of economic experts — modeled, 
perhaps, on the Federal Reserve Board
or the Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) — to rule on matters that mate-
rially affect living standards. “The
Supreme Court is able to declare
something unconstitutional,” Caplan
says. “Why can’t the CEA declare
something uneconomical?” He even
goes so far as to float, but not 
quite endorse, the idea of giving extra
votes to more educated people, since
their views will be more compatible
with mainstream economic thought.
We are left with an argument that is
soundly reasoned, compelling, and
incredibly elitist. Also, as some critics
have pointed out, Caplan’s argument
asks that people think more like 
economists — except when it comes
to understanding his own model,
which undermines standard rational
expectations economic theory.
To Caplan, his work adds up to
something in between a reorientation
and a debunking of public choice 
theory. “I can still accept 75 percent of
[public choice theory], but with a big
asterisk,” Caplan says. “It’s not so
much about sneaking bad policy




So, do pork-barrel projects and protec-
tionist policies endure because voters
are ignorant or because they want
them? William Niskanen, former acting
chairman of the CEA during the
Reagan administration and current
chairman of the Cato Institute, the 
libertarian think tank, is familiar with
both Caplan and his recent work. He 
is unconvinced.
The weakness in Caplan’s premise,
Niskanen says, is his reliance on 
a survey with open-ended questions. 
It may be that the general public
believes that raising the minimum
wage is a good idea while economists
disagree. But if you extend the ques-
tion with the information that raising
the minimum wage may decrease
employment for the least-skilled
workers, the public may be less 
enthusiastic. And if so, then that is evi-
dence against systematic irrationality.
It is, quite plainly, rational ignorance.
“The responses to public opinion
polls that he uses as proof of his 
conjecture I think are quite mislead-
ing,” Niskanen says. “The questions
don’t convey anything about the effects
of the policy. Their response is consis-
tent with the general premise 
of public choice that voters are ration-
ally ignorant about most detailed
public policies.”
If voters were in fact systematically
irrational, we would expect to see more
evidence of it in their actual behavior
— their “revealed preferences,” in 
economic jargon. Niskanen points to
his own research on presidential 
election rates of incumbent parties.
The rate of re-election goes up with
economic growth, down as a function
of government spending, and down
sharply if the nation is at war. Similarly,
other research has shown that people
move to states with solid economic
growth and away from those with
growth in government spending and
taxes. “The response to macro-eco-
nomic performance, public finance,
and war conditions to me looks quite
rational,” Niskanen says.
This is a new debate. Academics
have yet to weigh in with substantial
responses to Caplan’s work, making 
it difficult to declare at this stage
whether The Myth of the Rational 
Voter will become landmark or a 
passing fancy. (For an academic 
book, it has been reviewed in a surpris-
ing number of popular magazines,
including  The New Yorker, The
Economist, and  The New York Times
Magazine.) What’s encouraging about
this debate is that it’s even happening.
The United States is a rich nation, with
one of the best-functioning democra-
cies in the world. Public choice theory 
has identified the core of some of 
democracy’s flaws, and now Caplan is
trying to advance our understanding 
of government failure.
Still, if you’re new to this discussion,
you may understandably be confused
and depressed. Public choice sees 
you as manipulated by special interests 
and probably lacking the wherewithal
to improve democracy with the 
dismantling of the regulatory state.
Bryan Caplan thinks you are getting
precisely what you’ve ordered, and
you’d do much better to listen 
to him or let other experts decide 
the details of U.S. economic policy.
There is, however, one thing about
which both  public choicers and Caplan
agree: Most people’s views about many
economic policies are woefully off 
the mark. RF
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